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Abstract
Sovereign default is often associated with disturbances in a country’s trade relations. Often
the defaulter’s currency depreciates while trade volume falls drastically. This paper develops
a model to incorporate real depreciation along with sovereign bankruptcy. The exchange rate
is determined in equilibrium as the relative price of imports. We demonstrate that a default
episode can imply up to a 30% real depreciation. This matches the depreciations observed in
crisis events for developing countries. We argue that much of the exchange rate movement is
explained by market clearing adjustments to trade disruptions in the aftermath of default.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign defaults are neither random nor isolated from other macroeconomic events. In particular,
fiscal insolvency often coincides with exchange rate depreciations. In this study, we motivate this
association between the endogenous default decision and currency depreciation. We investigate the
channel through which a government bankruptcy can disrupt trade relations abroad and quantify its
contribution to real depreciation. Then, if default implies a terms-of-trade penalty, we examine how
it can determine a country’s default decision. We find that a default penalty through this “trade
channel” can create realistic depreciations. This introduces a borrower’s preference for imports as
a factor in default. From this mechanism, the defaulter’s decision is not necessarily monotone in
income fluctuations, which partially answers why defaults are not always during recession.
Establishing a theoretical connection between default and trade disruption is important because
empirical literature has often noted that sovereign default and currency crises — rapid exchange rate
depreciation — strike together. However, quantitative models typically treat sovereign default in
isolation of other crises. In these models, default happens in equilibrium when debt service becomes
more onerous than the penalty, which is often reduced to restricted access to credit and a reduction
in output. Instead, we focus on the disruption to trade in data that is regularly associated with
default. While there is vigorous debate about what adverse effects confront a would-be sovereign
defaulter, the effect on the pattern of trade cannot be ignored. In this spirit, we introduce a model
in which a country desires imported goods, but these become more expensive if it reneges on its
debt. Our country has open markets for financial and goods flows, and to preserve relatively cheap
international trade it must meet its financial obligations.
Since exchange rates have floated, defaulters have experienced large nominal exchange depreci-
ations that are mostly coincident to real depreciations. If sovereign governments internalize their
citizens’ desire for imported goods, averting this depreciation motivates a country to keep its debt
service current. In default, countries’ terms of trade deteriorate, which means that more domestic
production is diverted towards exports in exchange for the same amount of imports. Our model
captures the features of the external sector in default: the currency depreciates and exports rise,
forcing households to consume less.
In this paper, we introduce this trade channel penalty to mimic the behavior of the external
sector in defaulting countries. New insights into how defaulters are punished are particularly
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important because there is no widespread, codified rule for dealing with defaulters. In focusing on
the trade channel, we link a country’s preferences for imports and the demand for its exports to its
propensity to default. This helps one to understand why similar fluctuations of domestic output
may lead to a default episode in some countries but not in others. We attain a reasonable real
depreciation prediction without calibrating for one, by fitting the international trade mechanism and
representative consumer’s preferences to real data. We attain sound comparative statics predictions
(particularly, we show how sudden change of tastes for import can lead to default). We measure
welfare gains from international trade, and compare them to first-best case, effectively positioning
the economy we study between financial autarky and perfect capital markets.
Our paper will proceed first by reviewing the empirical data on sovereign defaults and the
external-sector results. In Section 2 we present our model. We calibrate it to Argentina and test
its implications in Section 3.
1.1 Models of Default
Our study of default extends earlier work on sovereign default in a small economy. At its root, our
model closely resembles the quantitative methods of consumer default models (see Chatterjee et al.
(2007)) that introduce a continuum of agents with stochastic income but imperfect risk sharing. In
the international setting, we follow the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), in which countries’
idiosyncratic income can only be buffered by defaultable bonds. Our work’s closest antecedent is
Arellano (2008), who computes a similar model with realistic business-cycle fluctuations.
In Arellano (2008), default depends on the history of output shocks and is punished by losing a
fixed percentage of output and by exclusion from borrowing for some random period. The income
penalty is motivated by an empirical finding that output falls after default on average. Tomz and
Wright (2007) suggest this mechanism is inadequate because the link between “bad times” and
default to be “surprisingly weak”—there is a great deal of variance around this negative mean.
They find that countries often default even in relatively good times and remain in default after
output has recovered, suggesting that the negative lagged correlation between default and output
is neither causal nor very significant. In fact, about 40% of the default episodes that Tomz and
Wright (2007) chronicle end with above trend output. Clearly, this evidence about domestic output
is not entirely consistent with models in which the cost of default is a penalty to income process,
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indicating the importance of of alternative punishments.
Tomz (2007) expands on this notion that recession and default are imperfectly correlated,
describing some defaults as “inexcusable,” or unexplained by economic fluctuations. Instead, he
posits that some regimes have an innate propensity to default. Indeed, since 1975 Standard and
Poor’s counts three foreign currency defaults by Argentine, Jamaica, Gabon, Indonesia, Peru, and
South Africa and four by Uruguay. We also see defaults precipitated by political changes (see e.g.
Todd (1991)). In a half century, Mexico defaulted twice when a new regime took over. In both
1861 under Benito Juarez and 1914 in the chaos after General Diaz, populist leaders put less value
on maintaining good standing internationally and defaulted.
Responding to Tomz and Wright (2007), which called for research on “mixed-models” of de-
fault, these examples should suggest that less outward-oriented sovereigns might be more willing
to default. We consider this scenario as a change in the preference for imported goods, so a gov-
ernment with a populist constituency tries to maximize a consumption basket with a relatively
smaller portion of imported goods. In our comparative statics analysis, we begin to consider how
a populist revolt with a reduced desire for foreign goods might spur default.
Other quantitative models have also tried to make the punishment mechanism more realistic;
Yue (2005) introduced Nash bargaining, and Bi (2008) made this bargaining game repeated. At
their root, however, defaulters suffer due to loss of output and exclusion from credit markets for
some time — they are still single-motive models. These models have no explicit role for the
international flow of goods, even though they describe open economies with free flow of capital.
Because there is no demand for foreign goods, only foreign borrowing, financial autarky only hurts
the bankrupt country because it may need to smooth over a future recession.
1.2 Motivating the Trade Channel Penalty
As described by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), “reputational” penalties alone are insufficient to support
positive debt in equilibrium. They suggest that trade sanctions might sufficiently discourage default
as to support realistic levels of debt. They justify such trade embargoes by speculating that a
country might rely on its reputation to maintain trade flows, and it would be damaged by a default
episode. They were not, however, modeling the trade channel penalty, or making quantitative
statements about its implications. Investigating the role of trade penalties further, Wright (2001)
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discusses the similarities between penalties to trade flows, assets or income. In some environments,
there is an equivalences in that any of these penalties can create a welfare loss that dominates the
gain from a country defaulting; we show how the trade channel has particularly interesting side
effects on trade patterns.
To drive our trade channel penalty, we must impose a deterioration in the country’s terms-of-
trade. At its extreme, this would be an absolute embargo, which, were not uncommon historically
when countries refused to pay their creditors. In the 1861 Mexican default, creditors actually seized
the port of Veracruz (see Todd (1991)). Circumnavigating gunboats certainly increased the “iceberg
costs” on Mexican exports. However, Tomz (2007) argues that even in the 19th century heyday
of gun boat diplomacy, outright military force only played a minor role in punishing defaulters.
Though debt repudiation was sometimes correlated with military action, violence usually ended
quickly.
Still, there is evidence that something impedes trade from bankrupt countries even today when
debt arbitration clearly does not carry the threat of cannon fire. Rose (2005) documents that
default reduces international trade by 8% for an extended period after default. He speculates that
trade suffers after default because international flows require short-term financing. In the aftermath
of default, trade partners will not extend this credit and raise the cost of cross-border trade. This
conjecture is consistent with Arteta and Hale (2008), who demonstrate that private firms find
international credit scarce after a sovereign default. That is, traders, who are private borrowers,
are punished for their government’s transgression. We do not explicitly model the traders’ demand
for short-run credit, but it could underly our mechanism.
Aside from disruptions to financing, we can root the trade penalty within the context of already
imperfect trade. Exporters are at the whim of other country’s trade officers, who can greatly
increase the cost of trading goods by overzealous customs inspections or other non-tariff trade
barriers. The time cost, deriving from uncooperative trade officials can add 10-30% to the cost
of imports, as estimated by Hummels (2001). Many of these costly bureacratic barriers must be
fungible and can be made more stringent for less-favored trade partners.
Furthermore, many developing economies depend on favorable trade agreements and sourcing
partnerships with the developed world. 195 active bilateral trade agreements have been reported
to the World Trade Organization by January 2009, any of which could be terminated in response
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to a financial episode and would effectively increase tariffs faced by a country’s exporters. Without
favored market access or the use of a trade partner transport infrastructure, the effect on the cost
of exporting goods is similar to additional “iceberg” costs. Default, as it mostly strikes poorer
countries, might also reduce the exports because most rich country imports from poor countries
tend to be at arms-length, rather than intra-firm, as noted by Antra`s (2003). Default may sever
these inter-firm trade links more easily than if trade was intra-firm.
1.3 Patterns of Trade in Default
Empirical international studies have shown that dual crises, debt and currency crises, are often tied.
De Paoli and Hoggarth (2006) explore defaults since 1975 and find a strong link between currency
crises and sovereign default. They propose an informal explanation for this observation related to
nominal rigidities and potential central bank insolvency. Here, we expand on this finding: Table
1 shows that even when depreciation might not qualify as a crisis, defaulters usually experience a
decline in their terms of trade. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the trade channel penalty can
generate a real depreciation and substitution towards domestic goods. While other literature often
keys on “hot” flows of funds and large changes to the nominal exchange rate, the real depreciation
that we model actually accounts for most of the change in relative prices.
Sovereign default also brings adjustments to trade volumes, both in the model and data. Due
to the depreciation repricing, domestic households substitute away from imports. In other words,
when sovereign default precipitates a change in price incentives with respect to the external sector,
households in our model adjust consistently with the data.
Table 1 presents the gross changes over a year for defaulters’ nominal effective exchange rate
(NEER), real effective exchange rate (REER), export price and the fraction of expenditure on
imports. Notice that the median defaulter has nearly the same depreciation in real exchange rate as
in nominal exchange rate after a year’s time. With higher frequency data, the NEER depreciation
tends to be sharper, but the REER quickly catches up. Table 1 suggests that our approach,
which models depreciation in bankruptcy in real terms, captures the essence. In some cases, the
nominal change is greater than the real, but in many of these instances, narrative evidence suggests
mismanagement by the monetary authority or financial market overreaction. Table 1 reveals that
this behavior is rather uncommon, and this leads us to model the more “routine” defaults.
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Gross change NEER REER Export Prices Imports/GDP
Mean 0.8492 0.8900 0.9184 0.8968
Median 0.9102 0.9220 0.9075 0.9211
Pr <.2 0.6835 0.7861 0.8291 0.7773
Pr <.4 0.8729 0.8688 0.8984 0.8978
Pr <.6 0.9505 0.9429 0.9269 0.9436
Pr <.8 1.0168 0.9755 1.0068 1.0070
Note: Exchange rate listed as foreign goods per home currency unit. Our data comes from the IMF’s IFS database and looks at defaulters since
1975, as identified by Beers and Chambers (2003).
Table 1: One year effect of sovereign default
Countries in default suffer a consistent drop of about 10% in the price of their exports in
foreign markets and the distribution of price changes is more tightly clustered than the depreciation
distribution. Because the REER weights their trading partners by volume of trade, it suggests that
the fall in export prices is more pronounced with a country’s more active trading partners. Our
model captures this price change observation. Defaulters receive fewer imports in return for the
same number of export goods, a fall in export price, which might stimulate domestic households to
substitute away from foreign goods, further affecting the exchange rate.
Even at high frequency, the depreciation is abrupt and follows the same trend as above, with
REER slightly trailing NEER. In Figure 1, we show the exchange rate dynamics in two recent
defaults, Ukraine and Paraguay. Note that in the Ukraine, real and nominal exchange rates move
almost indistinguishably. This suggests that post-default currency depreciations are not merely
evidence that shaky sovereigns impel hot capital to flee, instead something more basic happens to
cross border exchange of real goods.
The data also reveal that households with bankrupt governments also spend relatively less on
imports, which have become more expensive following the price changes. This fact is an amalgam
of competing forces: the substitution effect would decrease imports, and the income effect would
also diminish the demand for imports, with imports as normal goods. On the other hand, average
income is lower in default. The falling share of imports suggests that this latter effect is not so
strong. In our model too, imports fall as a share of spending. Though Tomz and Wright (2007)
suggest that income is not a dependable correlator with default, it does seem to reliably change
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Figure 1: Dynamics of exchange rates in Paraguay and Ukraine, nominal and real. Exchange rates
are normalized so that maximum value on sample is 1.
trade flows.
2 The Model
Our model of default extends the models of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008),
integrating a commodity space with both domestic and foreign goods. We describe a small open
economy in which a government internalizes its citizens preferences over domestic goods, ct, and
imports,mt. These goods are imperfect substitutes with constant elasticity,
1
1−κ in our formulation.
The relative price of exports is the exchange rate, et. Imports are exchanged for exports, xt by
import firms according to mt = f(xt). Their profit, Πt, goes back to households.
Asset markets are incomplete with one period bonds serving as the only insurance against shocks
to the income stream, yt. The sovereign borrows bt on behalf of its citizens from an international
market paying a coupon qt. Debt contracts are not enforceable, so the country may default. As
punishment, the country suffers a deterioration in terms of trade and financial autarky for a random
period of time.
The domestic country maximizes
U(ct,mt;κ, α), (1)
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subject to the income process and budget constraint
ct + etmt + bt = yt + qtbt+1 +Πt, (2)
log yt = ρ log yt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N (0, s
2). (3)
The importer transforms exports to imports according to
mt = f(xt) : f
′(·) ≥ 0, f ′′(·) ≤ 0. (4)
In particular, we specify the import export technology to be f(xt) = θ1(xt − θ0)
θ. This tech-
nology is a reduced-form representation of the rest of the world’s demand for domestic goods. For
θ < 1, the home country’s exports receive diminishing returns in terms of imports. This is equiva-
lent to assuming diminishing marginal utility of the country’s goods to the foreign consumers. θ0
allows for fixed costs to exporting, though in our calibration we find its value to be small.
Certainly, we could motivate the demand coming from the rest of the world (ROW) with a
structural formulation for preferences. However, from the point of view of the small open economy,
only the ROW demand can be observed, and this demand function is sufficient to pick the optimal
quantity of exports. Both estimating and imposing an explicit form for the ROW utility seems
treacherous. From an economist’s perspective, calibrating the preferences of the ROW is daunting
because one must aggregate structural preferences, but the weighting of the relative importance
of a trade partner is only observed in equilibrium. Aesthetically, a full optimization by the ROW
might be preferable, but we choose to keep our model focused and parsimonious; our contribution
is not on why countries trade, but rather on why they default.
Much of our analysis would go through with a simpler linear technology, f(xt) = θ1xt. With a
linear technology, the trade channel penalty would cause depreciation in default, but the deprecia-
tion would be one-for-one with the size of the penalty. We would essentially be directly imposing
the size of depreciation, instead of allowing it to be determined endogenously by preferences. Our
preferred form better matches the stylized facts. In particular, (with a linear technology) the
depreciation would be the same size every time, but Table 1 reveals that this is not the case.
2.1 Timing
Time is infinite and discrete. At the beginning of each period, a country’s state variables — income,
borrowing to repay, and default status — are common knowledge. The first choice is whether to
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default; then country chooses consumption, trade and borrowing policies. If the country is in good
standing, it faces a coupon price schedule from its creditors who will charge a premium over the
fixed world interest rate based upon the probability of default in the next period.
If the country defaults, then it experiences a terms-of-trade deterioration before its trade policy
is set. The equilibrium exchange rate clears the international trade markets. As in Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981), countries in default are in financial autarky, and their bond position reverts to
zero. Unlike the aforementioned article, countries can leave this defaulted state each period with
an exogenous probability of being “forgiven”.
2.2 Representative Household and Government
The sovereign government internalizes the problem of the representative household. In particular,
household preferences take the form u(ct,mt;κ, α) = [αc
κ
t +(1−α)m
κ
t ]
1−σ
κ /(1−σ). We will formulate
the representative household problem recursively. Given income realization, y, bond position, b,
and the indicator of whether it is being punished, taking as exogenous the price of bonds, q(·, ·) and
imports, e(·), the government solves two subproblems, one if it decides to default and one if it does
not default. The solution to the non-default problem is summarized by the value function V (b, y)
and the defaulter’s problem has value function W (y). The default decision is the argmax of these
two functions, and the government’s value function, U(b, y) is the envelope over the subproblem
value functions, V (·, ·),W (·). Formally, the government solves the Household Problem:
U(b, y) = max
h∈{0,1}
hW (y) + (1− h)V (b, y),
where h ∈ {0, 1} indicates default. Conditional on not defaulting this period, the Household’s
Problem In Good Standing is:
V (b, y) = max
c,m,b′
u(c,m) + βEU(b′, y′), (5)
s.t.
c+ em+ b = y + q(y, b′)b′ +Π,
ln y′ = ρ ln y + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N (0, s2).
The debt discount q(y, b′) adjusts the price of borrowing to accommodate the probability of
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default. By choosing b′ = b0, the country accepts the contract that gives it q(y, b0)b0 units of home
good this period and takes away b0 units of home goods next period. Using discounts instead of
returns permits banks to decide not lend at all, which may happen when default is nearly certain
because of an extremely high level of debt, which imply an infinite interest rate.
If country chooses to default, then its value function is an optimal solution to The Household
Problem In Default:
W (y) = max
c,m
u(c,m) + βE
(
φW (y′) + (1− φ)U(0, y′)
)
, (6)
s.t.
c+ em = y +Π,
ln y′ = ρ ln y + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N (0, s2).
2.3 Importers
The importers face a trade demand given by equation (4) from the rest of the world. Note, that
the country does not face a perfectly elastic demand from the rest of the world. Instead, this is a
“small country model” only in that the decisions of the country do not affect the demand of the
rest of the world. In case of default, equation (4) is shifted to generate the terms of trade shock
that serves as punishment.
Domestic importers take exports x from their countrymen at the price of the consumption good
and exchange them for m, taking their price e as given. If the country is being punished for default,
it receives fraction 1− π fewer imports. Their problem is summarized by Importer’s Problem:
Π(x,m, h) = em− x,
s.t.
m = (1− π)hf(x).
Notice that the trade channel penalty, 1−π enters as if there were a sudden increase in iceberg
costs. This is a conscious choice, intended to expose defaulters to trade barriers that increase the
cost of sending their goods abroad. For example, country’s exporters may find that its exports sit
in customs longer after default, that foreign trade inspectors are more deliberate or, more benignly,
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that favorable trade agreements are canceled; this can be an efficient way of adding real costs of
exporting, and Hummels (2001) shows how more time en route can be a trade barrier. Alternatively,
one can think of country getting π less imports for the same amount of exports as a crude defaulted
debt renegotiation process.
Figure 2 depicts the effect of the trade penalty, given the concave functional form of f(x). The
export quantity is a distance from disposable income to consumption of home produced goods. The
endogenous exchange rate, e is the slope of the tangent.
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Figure 2: The export-import transformation function and the effect of the trade channel penalty
2.4 International Financial Markets
Denote the default decision control h(y, b) = I (W (y) > V (y, b)). It is equal to 1 when country
announces default. World financial markets are risk-neutral but cannot enforce their debt contracts.
They have perfect knowledge of the sovereign’s problem, so they have zero profits and set q(y, b′)
so that the expected return equals the international risk-free rate of return R. The credit market
Zero Profit Condition is:
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q(y, b′) =
1− E[h(y′, b′)]
1 +R
.
2.5 Recursive Equilibrium
The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a collection of
• consumer choice functions (cV (y, b), b
′
V (y, b),mV (y, b)) when the country is not in default,
• consumer choice functions (cW (y, b),mW (y, b)) when the country is in default,
• consumer’s default choice function h(y, b),
• consumer’s value functions (V (y, b),W (y), U(y, b)),
• importer choice variables in no default state (xV m(y, b),mV m(y, b),ΠV (y, b))
• importer choice variables in the default state (xWm(y),mWm(y),ΠW (y)),
• and price variables (eV (y, b), eW (y), q(y, b
′))
such that:
• (cV (y, b), b
′
V (y, b),mV (y, b)) solve the Household’s Problem In Default, given ΠV (y, b),
eV (y, b) and U(y, b), and V (y, b) is the value function of this problem.
• (cW (y, b),mW (y, b)) solve the Household’s Problem In Good Standing, conditional on
ΠW (y), eW (y) and U(y, b), and W (y) is the value function of this problem.
• (h(y, b)) solve the Household Problem conditional on V (y, b) and W (y), and U(y, b) is the
value function of this problem.
• (xV m(y, b),mV m(y, b)) solve the Importer’s Problem conditional on eV (y, b), and ΠV (y, b) is
the value function of this problem.
• (xWm(y),mWm(y)) solve the Importer’s Problem conditional on eW (y), and ΠW (y) is the
value function of this problem.
• q(y, b′) satisfies the Zero Profit Condition given on h(y, b).
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• eV (y, b) is such that import market clearing condition mV (y, b) = mVm(y, b) holds.
• eW (y) is such that import market clearing condition mW (y) = mWm(y) holds.
Equilibrium exists for the same reason as in Arellano (2008); our problem is separable between
borrowing and consumption. After the value of borrowing for the next period is chosen, the
allocation of available income between consumption and imports is maximizing monotone function
upon compact set.
3 Quantitative Evaluations
To evaluate the predictive power of our model, we calibrate our baseline version to Argentine’s
historical data, following much other related research. Argentine experienced three international
default occurrences, in 1982, 1989 and 2002. None of the restructuring periods were particularly
long. All these defaults were accompanied by nominal exchange rate depreciation and non-zero
trade balances.
3.1 Quarterly Data
Our parameter values come from our own estimates and Arellano (2008). Specifically, we estimated
the parameters of income time series, the goods relative preference parameters, and import-export
relationship parameters and borrowed the values of R, β, φ and σ. INDEC, National Institute
of Statistics and Censuses, provides quarterly estimates of GDP composites, deseasonalized and
in same-year prices, for years of 1993-2008. To make per capita values, we divide by the annual
population of Argentina, obtained from CIA Factbook. To convert the import data from peso
expenditure into quantities of foreign goods we used the real exchange rate taken from the European
Central Bank website1.
The parameters that we used were estimated on the quarterly dataset from 1993 to 2008, and
are provided in a following table.
Most of our estimates seem close to similar estimations by others. In the international trade
literature, most parameter estimates seem to be vigorously debated, though Ruhl (2003) nicely
1From Statistical Data Warehouse section, located at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
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Parameter Value Explanation Rationale
R 0.017 Unconditional expected rate of return required
by international banking system.
Quarterly return on US
5 year bond
ρ 0.9849 Autocorrelation of log-output. Estimated
s 0.0258 Standard Deviation of log-output. Estimated
π Varying Trade penalty for defaulting.
φ 0.7180 Probability of being not forgiven on the next
period.
Sandleris et al. (2004)
β 0.953 Subjective time discount factor. Arellano (2008)
α 0.5859 Parameter of the instantaneous utility function;
weight of home good consumption.
Estimated
κ 0.8447 Parameter of the instantaneous utility function;
corresponds to 6.441 elasticity of substitution of
export to import.
Estimated
σ 2 Parameter of the instantaneous utility function;
corresponds to -1 elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution.
Arellano (2008)
θ 0.2082 Curvature of export-import transformation
function.
Estimated
θ0 0.0467 Relative position of export-import transforma-
tion function.
Estimated
θ1 0.1959 Scale of export-import transformation function. Estimated
Table 2: Parameter values, quarterly data.
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situates the discussion on the proper elasticity parameter κ. Compared to other international
business cycle models, our elasticity estimate is slightly high.
For details about the estimation of our import-export parameters, θ, θ0, θ1, see Appendix B.3.
We are not aware of others who have estimated a comparable functional. However, Das et al.
(2001) find fixed costs for export supply close to zero using firm-level data. This is consistent with
our value for θ0. Hummels and Klenow (2005) analyzed the growth of exports from developing
countries and found that up to 60% of the increase comes from the “extensive margin.” Rather
than deepening existing trade relationships, countries increase exports by diversifying their goods
or partners. This seems to be evidence that export markets quickly become satiated and justifies
small θ.
3.2 Solving for the Recursive Equilibrium
Since competition in the home market is perfect, the solution to the equilibrium is the same
as solving with a centralized home economy in which the importer’s problem is internal to the
household. We call this the Centralized Equilibrium, and describe it in Appendix A.
Every period the country faces an import-generating technology, f(x) as in equation 4 and
allocates its consumption between imports and domestic production, as illustrated on Figure 2.
Disposable income is y + b− q(b′(y, b))b′(y, b) if country can borrow and y if the country cannot.
To numerically solve this problem, we use value function iteration to solve each subproblem of
the Centralized Equilibrium, which is equivalent to solving The Household Problem In Default and
The Household Problem In Good Standing. Each of these value functions converges trivially. The
Household Problem is characterized by the max of these two value functions, and default occurs
where W exceeds V . Because both functions are monotone in y and −b, for a given value of b, they
may cross. As discussed in Arellano (2008), we should have a single crossing, which means that
there is a single b(y) that defines the maximum level of debt before the country defaults, given a
realization of y.
In the Argentine default example, the estimate of ln(1 − π) is -0.6939, which implies π ≈ 0.5.
We take this estimate as illustrative as there is no international policy for punishing defaulters,
so there is no guarantee that one estimate for π should hold in other contexts. We evaluate the
model’s predictions at various punishment levels, to obtain bounds on plausible outcomes, and to
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account for potential short-sample biases. Varying the value of π ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} also serves to
demonstrate the effect of the trade channel punishment. We see that the country’s default policies
and behavior in default is sensitive to the magnitude of the trade channel punishment.
3.3 Welfare Comparisons
To understand our model with incomplete markets, we compare its agents’ welfare to two extremes:
complete asset markets and absent asset markets. With incomplete markets, bankruptcy provides
some insurance against uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk, as discussed in Livshits et al. (2007). π
determines the cost of such insurance, and affects both consumption and expected utility. For
comparisons, we set π = 0.5 and other parameters follow Table 2. The expected value func-
tion in stationary distribution is -18.4318 and the average volume of the consumption aggregate,
(αcκ + (1− α)mκ)1/κ, is 0.5868. The certainty equivalent of aggregate consumption is 0.5358. The
risk premium is 9%, defined as Ec˜cCE − 1 where C˜ is the actual aggregate consumption and cCE is
an aggregate consumption certainty equivalent.
Expected util-
ity
Aggregare con-
sumption CE
Risk premium CE difference
w/ benchmark
Benchmark -18.4318 0.5358 9%
Financial Autarky -19.7300 0.5189 3% -4%
First Best -15.3818 0.5804 0% +8%
Table 3: Welfare comparison.
The first best scenario provides agents with complete asset markets, which implies perfect
consumption smoothing. At the other extreme, in financial autarky, the country cannot save or
borrow and cannot insure against income shocks. We elaborate on the results in Appendix C and
they are summarized in Table 3.
3.4 Equilibrium Results
We obtain three interesting equilibrium predictions. First, country borrows more if it had a history
of negative income shocks, i.e. high current borrowing. Second, the current account is countercycli-
cal, in line with data and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Third, positive shocks to income depreciate
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the home currency. The borrowing policy result is immediate, as it is a consequence of risk-aversity
of a representative consumer. Most endogenous default papers have this result.
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Figure 3: Borrowing policy. Curves stop on right at the point of default.
Our countercyclical current account (Figure 4) is consistent with data and, as Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) point out, nontrivial. In a partial equilibrium, positive shocks would induce savings
and a positive current account, but if the interest rate is endogenous, it falls with positive income
shocks (because the probability of default is counter cyclical) and spurs borrowing. Arellano (2008)
has a pro-cyclical current account, and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) shows that in their framework,
without demand for trade, the current account’s correlation depends on the specification of income
process. In our model, the current account is governed by both consumer preferences for foreign
goods, the importing technology and consumption smoothing. In this richer trade environment, the
behavior of the current account does not just mirror the agents’ borrowing policy. As our major
contribution relies on the trading process that we model, we treat this result as a sign that our
trading process properly approximates reality.
The counter cyclical exchange rate is a new result in the endogenous default literature, though
Chari et al. (2002) and others establish a similar result in data and in various models. Chari
et al. (2002) shows that a fairly standard RBC can generate counter cyclical real exchange rate
movements. The intuition within our model is that with an increase in y, the country’s possibility
frontier in terms of (c,m) moves outwards. Consumption of both goods increase because the goods
are normal. Since the marginal utility of consumers abroad goes down with additional exports, the
exchange rate must rise with the increase in demand for foreign goods. It is important, however, to
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Figure 4: Current account conditional on output in stationary distribution.
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Figure 5: Exchange rate conditional on output in stationary distribution.
understand that foreign consumers in the model have no income shocks. To compare our result to
the data, one must consider potential shifts in the world’s demand function, which would manifest
itself in Equation (4) and may shift the tangency point in Figure 2.
Notice also that the exchange rate is higher in default, though not 11−pi = 2 times higher —
that happens because of the change in trade volumes due to substituting away from imports. The
penalty shifts the line down, but the households are also able to adjust their consumption basket,
and due to the curvature of Equation 4, this affects the exchange rate. As discussed earlier, we
could generate a depreciation with linear trade technology, but the nonlinearity due to θ < 1 allows
for this additional freedom. As the data reveal, there is variation in the size of depreciation and
trade volumes tend to shift, both consistent with our preferred parameterization.
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3.5 The Effect Of Penalty Levels
Figure 6 depicts the default decision threshold, the debt such that the country defaults if borrowing
goes any higher. The small penalty case, π = 0.2, in which very little debt can be supported recalls
the result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989). As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), the
sustainable debt increases in y; which makes the interest rate spread counter cyclical. The right
panel of Figure 6, demonstrates, that the borrowing limit does not increase as fast as y, so that an
expansion does not imply that a borrower can support a higher percentage of debt. This monotone
slope, however, reflects the particular parameterization. With different specification (namely, low
θ), it can yield an interestingly U-shaped borrowing limit. With this result, recessionary countries
with low y, have greater incentive to stay in good standing because they expect the negative shock
to persist; and countries with high output realizations are also less likely to default; however, in
the middle, countries default on much smaller debt level.
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Note: Argentine had debt of around 30% of GDP at the end of 2001, and normalized detrended GDP of 0.95.
Figure 6: Default decision borrowing threshold.
The penalty value changes the exchange rate adjustment post default, as seen in Figure 7. The
exchange rate change pictured is calculated as the difference between the exchange rate in a default
state and the exchange rate just before the default. That is, if the country has a debt that leaves
it indifferent between defaulting and remaining in good standing, what would be the difference of
exchange rates in these two cases? This thought experiment about the moment of default is close
to thinking about two otherwise equal countries, one slightly below the default threshold, and one
just above. Such a comparison isolates the change purely as a response to default decision. The
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figure reveals that the level of penalty determines the size of the depreciation. However, the country
moderates some welfare damage by substituting domestic product for import consumption. The
amount of depreciation does not depend much on the country’s position in the business cycle.
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1.15 on this figure means that foreign goods cost 15% more after default than before default. Penn World Tables report 18% real exchange rate
depreciation in 2002 in Argentine.
Figure 7: Exchange rate drop due to default.
Figure 8 (left) illustrates the substitution behavior of domestic households. Country seem to
have the same consumption policy at the moment of default independently of the level of π, that’s
why consumption policy before default is represented by a single line (this qualitatively holds
for other parameterizations). As the trade channel penalty rises, the substitution effect becomes
stronger. Figure 2 reveals the link between the change in the makeup of the consumption basket
and the exchange rate that we highlighted earlier. Home good consumption is a normal good, and
in a default state, an increase in income leads to an increase in consumption; while in the good
standing state, higher income allows the country to borrow more, somewhat negating the decreasing
returns to scale of import-export relation. A positive shock to income in a defaulted country will
lead to increased consumption of home goods; a positive shock in non-defaulted country can lead
to a more than one-for-one increase in exports.
Figure 8 (right) demonstrates the pattern of import’s share in consumption. Decreasing returns
to scale of the export-import relation make the dependence on y negative: countries in expansion
21
0.5 1 1.5 2
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
y
do
m
es
tic
 g
oo
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n,
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 y
, a
fte
r d
ef
au
lt
pi=0.2
pi=0.5
pi=0.8
Before default
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
y
e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
im
po
rte
d 
go
od
, f
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 y
, a
fte
r d
ef
au
lt
pi=0.2
pi=0.5
pi=0.8
Before default
Figure 8: Domestic good consumption (left) and foreign good expenditure (right).
export ever greater amounts to get additional units of imports. Trade channel penalties have both
direct effects on the level of import (by construction of the model), and indirect effects through
substitution. As in the data, proportional expenditure on imports falls following default; countries
in expansion after default benefit from not servicing the debt (which they’d have to if they did not
defaulted), which instead they can spend on consumption, including imports. Notice that share of
imports for high y countries exceeds (1− π) times the corresponding value before default.
Figure 9 shows the change in capital account and trade balance at the moment of default
decision. The trade balance improves more drastically in countries in downturn and the penalty
level contributes significantly to the change size. The difference between the change in trade balance
and change in capital account is the change in assets inflow. This might involve foreign currency
reserves of respective central bank. Particularly, it implies that a country that defaults in a cyclical
expansion and faces π = 0.8 would have to come up with additional assets equal up to 5% of GDP.
Combined with a policy of fixed exchange rate and capital controls, that extra inflow can create a
greater than necessary nominal money mass, resulting in inflation.
To summarize, a higher trade channel penalty leads to: (a) greater household adjustment
through the domestic consumption basket, and trade quantities, (b) higher sustainable debt, and
(c) greater exchange rate depreciation.
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Figure 9: Trade balance (left) and capital account (right) changes at default.
3.6 Comparative Statics
Figure 10 summarizes the expected differences that should arise in cross-country data. The param-
eters we consider are a change in preferences for imports (α decreased by 0.1), a change in ability
to forgive (φ increased by 0.1) and a change in variance of income (s2 doubled the value). The
penalty π in benchmark case is set at 0.5.
Changing α affects the willingness to default. A country that is less import-oriented defaults
sooner and consumes less import in all states. A rapid change in tastes toward home consumption
could precipitate default. Consider a government with debt just below the maximum allowable
with a certain value for α; then, if this sovereign suddenly cared less about the import component
of consumption, the level of allowable debt will shift down, possibly below the existing stock. In
a populist coup, the new government might internalize the preferences of a different social group,
one which consumes relatively fewer imports. This abrupt change of tastes of the sovereign’s
constituency — if combined with severe pre-existing debt — could result in default and explain
some of the “inexcusable” defaults of Tomz (2007).
Loading this experiment on α with so much meaning is knowingly problematic. It is not actually
a story consistent with our model, as our CES preferences are homothetic, so a poorer social strata
should still have the same demand for imports. Further, our country’s household is representative.
If a coup implies a change to the preferences that the sovereign internalizes we should have to justify
this with some explicit strategy for aggregation a diverse population. In the simplest case, our result
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Figure 10: Comparative statics.
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is equivalent to a model in which a sovereign that puts full weight on his median constituent. Then,
if this groups changes, the preferences upon which he acts would also change.
After default, there is a stronger improvement in trade balance when α is lower, because a
lower α country will forego more home consumption in both relative and absolute respects. The
new preference regime, by consuming fewer imports, moves down the decreasing returns import-
export technology, and so in the aftermath of a default, can sell into a “steeper” market.
The variance of the income process does not notably affect the patterns of trade adjustment
relation, either before or after default. However, it affects the default decision through the financial
exclusion penalty. This does not necessarily conflict with the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) finding
that financial exclusion cannot sustain debt, because we also exclude countries from saving while in
bankruptcy. Countries in expansion are more motivated to sustain debt than medium-range coun-
tries. The intuition is that high income variance countries obtain higher benefits from maintaining
good standing in order to be able to smooth consumption in the future.
Also, observe that the variance of the composition of import and home goods is higher when y
is high, and therefore the impact of increased variance is stronger on the right tail of income distri-
bution. That leads to greater aversion to financial autarky, and consequently, to bigger tolerance of
debt. Therefore, countries with higher income volatility might actually be safer for investors than
steady economies.
The value of φ affects the cost of default, but once the choice between defaulting and staying
prudent has been made, φ does not affect other tradeoffs, and therefore does not change the policies
significantly. The bigger is φ, the worse is a country’s cost of default and this its aversion becomes
even stronger if it is currently experiencing an expansion. However, bigger φ demands more defiance
from international lenders: longer punishment means loss of positive NPV projects and restraining
selves from exports of the punished country. These concerns over enforcement are explored more
in Wright (2001), but we just take as given that penalties are credible.
The comparative statics demonstrate that our model is qualitatively robust to parameter val-
ues, and provide additional insights into parallel problems (such as the consequences of populist
uprisings and international risk management). The existing literature noted that business cycle
fluctuations do not account for a significant fraction of historical default episodes. Our compara-
tive statics demonstrate how changes in underlying parameters immediately result in significantly
25
different equilibrium strategies — and confuse the identification of the business cycle contribution.
Moreover, we can see that default boundary condition on debt shape differently with respect to
output fluctuations with respect to these parameters; countries will demonstrate different default
behavior. Even “inexcusable” in Tomz (2007) sense behavior is not outside of offered model’s scope;
it only implies certain heterogeneity of parameters.
The top right plot of Figure 10 demonstrates that changing parameters does not change equi-
librium depreciation much (and parameters that are changed, are changed a lot). In fact, only two
parameters seem to matter for depreciation: κ and π. Other parameters, chosen to match Arellano
(2008) do not affect equilibrium default depreciation, which seems to be arising from the combi-
nation of CES utility function and the proportional penalty. With respect to other parameters,
our model is (knowingly) ill-suited to match certain moments of the data. For example, without
long-term contracts Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009) suggests models will not be able to match
default frequency without undue manipulation of other paramters. In the interest of conservatism,
we kept many parameters from the literature. Equilibrium depreciation, our chief concern, depends
mostly upon the few parameters that we have discussed.
4 Conclusion
Our paper introduces a model that accounts for the systematic linkage between sovereign default
and real exchange rate deprecation. Prior research has noted this empirical connection, but has
not explained it quantitatively. Other quantitative models that capture the contribution of output
fluctuations to the default strategy, they do not consider the open economy for what it is: a market
for the exchange of differentiated goods rather than merely imperfect insurance against stochastic
income shocks. Incorporating this goods trade we developed a model in which penalties to the
trade channel create realistic patterns of default and adjustment within bankruptcy. In particular,
we capture real depreciation without apealing to monetary transmission. From our results, real
depreciation can account for most of the depreciation that is observed post-default. The domestic
consumption allocations respond realistically to price incentives after default and imply enough loss
of welfare to dissuade sovereigns from defaulting.
As a model of equilibrium sovereign default, our trade channel penalty allows a country to
support a realistic level of debt before default. But in keeping with our focus on the trade in goods,
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the country’s theoretical maximum borrowing burden is not necessarily a monotonic function of
output. We explore the model’s response to changes in variables other than income by computing
its comparative statics. Generally, these parameter manipulations are intuitive, and help to identify
several factors in the default decision. We and investigate their effects on default and trade policy
and generate policy recommendations.
The model is naturally sensitive to specification. We chose a form that is consistent with pre-
existing literature in trade and default, but these functions are essentially arbitrary choices from an
infinite set of possible forms. However, the model is parsimonious and complete enough to generate
qualitative and quantitative predictions in line with reality.
In this exercise, we calibrated to Argentine in order to demonstrate the import-export mecha-
nism, which is the real innovation of our paper. This calibration gave us realistic parameters and we
succeeded in generating reasonable predictions for the default decision and subsequent international
adjustments. Future research might try to match individual default episodes more closely. We are
also interested in integrating the nominal issues and financial flows in the model to capture effects
like inflation and stochastic variations in interest and exchange rates. This paper, however, elides
these concerns, to emphasize and clarify the real factors behind the default-linked depreciation.
We have begun to discuss how parameter changes could change the probability of default.
Future work should more formally consider a mixed-model of default. A particularly promising
avenue is to integrate parameter risk into endogenous variables, e.g. how does the probability of a
coup effecting α modify the interest rate’s default premium? Our discussion also raises the potential
of models with heterogeneous agents and competing interests. Our simple model, considering trade
and default, might be fruitfully combined with various other branches of the study of crisis.
27
References
Aguiar, M. and G. Gopinath (2006): “Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Ac-
count,” Journal of International Economics, 69, 64–83.
Antra`s, P. (2003): “Firms, Contracts, And Trade Structure,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118, 1375–1418.
Arellano, C. (2008): “Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies,” American
Economic Review, 98, 690–712.
Arteta, C. and G. Hale (2008): “Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector,” Journal
of International Economics, 74, 53 – 69.
Beers, D. T. and J. Chambers (2003): “Sovereign Defaults: Heading Lower into 2004,” Research
Report 09/2003, Standard and Poor’s RatingsDirect.
Bi, R. (2008): “Beneficial Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations,” IMFWorking Papers 08/38,
International Monetary Fund.
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1989): “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?” American
Economic Review, 79, 43–50.
Chari, V. V., P. J. Kehoe, and E. R. McGrattan (2002): “Can Sticky Price Models Generate
Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates?” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 533–63.
Chatterjee, S., D. Corbae, M. Nakajima, and J.-V. Rios-Rull (2007): “A Quantitative
Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default,” Econometrica, 75, 1525 – 1589.
Chatterjee, S. and B. Eyigungor (2009): “Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk,” Tech.
rep.
Das, S., M. J. Roberts, and J. R. Tybout (2001): “Market Entry Costs, Producer Hetero-
geneity, and Export Dynamics,” Nber working papers, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
De Paoli, B. and G. Hoggarth (2006): “Costs of Sovereign Default,” Bank of England Quar-
terly Bulletin, Fall 2006.
28
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981): “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Em-
pirical Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies, 48, 289 – 309.
Hodrick, R. J. and E. C. Prescott (1997): “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical
Investigation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 1–16.
Hummels, D. (2001): “Time as a trade barrier,” Research report, Purdue University.
Hummels, D. and P. J. Klenow (2005): “The Variety and Quality of a Nation’s Exports,”
American Economic Review, 95, 704–723.
Livshits, I., J. MacGee, and M. Tertilt (2007): “Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start,”
American Economic Review, 97, 402–418.
Rose, A. K. (2005): “One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International
Trade,” Journal of Development Economics, 77, 189 – 206.
Ruhl, K. J. (2003): “Solving the Elasticity Puzzle in International Economics,” mimeo, University
of Minnesota.
Sandleris, G., G. R. Gelos, and R. Sahay (2004): “Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Coun-
tries: What Determines Market Access?” IMF Working Papers 04/221, International Monetary
Fund.
Todd, W. F. (1991): “A History of International Lending,” in Research in Financial Services, ed.
by G. Kaufman, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, vol. 3, 201–289.
Tomz, M. (2007): Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Cen-
turies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tomz, M. and M. L. J. Wright (2007): “Do Countries Default in Bad Times?” Journal of the
European Economic Association, 5, 352–360.
Wright, M. L. J. (2001): “Limited commitment: Theory with applications to repudiation risk,”
Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago.
Yue, V. Z. (2005): “Sovereign Default and Debt Renegotiation,” 2005 Meeting Papers 138, Society
for Economic Dynamics.
29
A Centralized Equilibrium
At the beginning of the game consumer chooses whether he wants to default or not is Household’s
New Problem:
U(b, y) = max
h∈{0,1}
hW (y) + (1− h)V (b, y).
The borrowers’s problem conditional on not defaulting this period is New Problem With No
Default:
V (b, y) = max
c,x,m,b′
u(c,m) + βEU(b′, y′), (7)
s.t.
c+ x+ b = y + q(y, b′)b′,
m = f(x),
ln y′ = ρ ln y + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N (0, s2).
If country chooses to default, then its value function is a solution toNew Problem In Default:
W (y) = max
c,x,m
u(c,m) + βE
(
φW (y′) + (1− φ)U(0, y′)
)
, (8)
s.t.
c+ x = y +Π,
m = (1− π)f(x),
ln y′ = ρ ln y + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N (0, s2).
Combined with the Zero Profit Condition, solution to this problem will give the same values as
the Equilibrium we want to study. However, it does not give the value of the exchange rate. We
recover this from the first-order conditions to the New household choice problems:
eV (y, b) =
∂u(cV (y, b),mV (y, b))
∂m
/
∂u(cV (y, b),mV (y, b))
∂c
eW (y) =
∂u(cW (y),mW (y))
∂m
/
∂u(cW (y),mW (y))
∂c
.
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B Estimation
To test our model’s implications, we estimated various parameters using Argentine data. In many
cases, we could have better characterized the Argentine data generating process with different
parametric functional forms, but this would distract from the model we introduce. Our goal is
not to match Argentine perfectly, though there is a certain virtue in doing so, but we fear that
additional complexity will impede one’s intuition for the model. Rather we decided to stay in the
simple world of AR(1) processes and (relatively) linear functions to provide a reasonable test of the
quantitative implications of our model .
B.1 Output Time Series
Output y was calibrated to quarterly deseasoned per-capita GDP in constant prices, which was
assumed to follow AR(1) process. It was not detrended because trend seems to be too small.
Regression equation is
ln yt −m = ρ(ln yt−1 −m) + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0, s
2).
m is the normalizing coefficient. Estimates are following:
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
m 9.0669∗ (0.1464)
ρ 0.9878∗ (0.0081)
s 0.0258
Table 4: Estimation results, output dynamics, One star denotes 1% significance.
A Dickey-Fuller test does not reject a unit root hypothesis for this process, therefore, given
standard deviations may be biased downward. Controlling a linear trend does not help to reject
the unit root hypothesis, nor does it give much different estimates of other parameters.
B.2 Consumer’s Utility Parameters
Utility function parameters were estimated from the first-order condition of consumer. c was taken
to be equal to consumption (both private and public) plus investment from INDEC data. Nominal
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imports quantity was deduced from import value from INDEC data divided by the exchange rate,
obtained from European Bank.
ln e = ln
1− α
α
+ (κ− 1)
(
ln
c/y
m/y
)
.
Estimates are following:
Table 5: Estimation results, output dynamics.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
1− κ 0.1553∗ (0.0440)
ln 1−αα -0.3472
∗ (0.0972)
Within a 95% condfidence interval, we can conclude that κ < 1, so goods are not perfect
substitutes, and α > 0.5. With the obvious transformations of the estimation in Table 5, κ = 0.8447
and α = 0.5859. Again, the regression is not perfect. An ARIMA(2,1,1) model specification seems
to perform better to correct for the nonstationarity for which exchange rates are notorious.
B.3 Import-Export Equation
The most interesting regression seems to be the trade equation. It was estimated by nonlinear least
squares:
lnmt = ln(1− π)I(punished at t) + ln θ1 + θ ln (xt − θ0) + ǫt.
Here we decided to allow the import-export equation to be nonlinear (θ not necessarily equal to
1), have a fixed cost (θ0 is not necessarily equal to 0). We do not explore why it happens that firms
can earn positive profits in equilibrium; we just allow estimates to signal us about that. These
degrees of freedom are not necessary, and they don’t drive our main result. However, they certainly
help to achieve better fit of default responses.
For numbers on imports and exports, we smoothed quarterly fluctuations on the INDEC data
using an HP filter Hodrick and Prescott (1997) with smoothing parameter 400.
The estimate of ln(1 − π) suggests that π is equal to 0.5 with surprising precision. We will
use this number in model outcome calculation; to make sure we don’t fall victim of regression’s
non-robustness, we also solve for the model with π = 0.8 and π = 0.2, so whatever is the real value
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Table 6: Estimation results, import-export conditions.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
θ 0.2082∗ (0.0763)
θ0 0.0467
∗ (0.0070)
θ1 0.1959
∗ (0.0409)
ln(1− π) -0.6939∗ (0.0256)
of π, the real outcome will be lying in between these two models’ outcomes. As for values of θs,
they are not too far away from the ones a person can get by estimating the 1993-2000 subsample
of “no default.”
We estimate this equation on a subsample of 1993-2003. The reason why we do not continue
on the sample of 2004 and further is that it seems that Argentine does not have the same instant
recovery of terms of trade after default as we have assumed in the model. Consider the time series
of ut =
∆mt
∆xt
xt
mt
, a measure of elasticity of change in import with the change of export, presented on
Figure 11. One can see an approximately constant elasticity during most of 1990s, then a decline,
a series of definite changes in structure of equation, and an increase in 2004, with a stable more
than 2 elasticity after default. The big jump down in 2001 is what we try to capture with (1− π)
multiplier. In this estimation, we allow for a period of adjustment, a process of re-establishing of
connections lost in 2001. Imports do not only increase due to an increase in x, but also from a
renewed efficiency of trading. Summarizing, we don’t use the data after default because we believe
that after forgiving the default import depends not only on export on the same period, but also on
export on previous periods.
C Solving for First Best
Solving the “first best” general equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following convex program-
ming problem, instead of the stochastic problem established above. Values for endogenous variables
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Figure 11: Time series of ut =
∆mt
∆xt
xt
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, “sample elasticity.”
carry the subscript zfb
V (y¯) = max
cfb,mfb
{αcκfb + (1− α)m
κ
fb}
(1−σ)/κ + βV (y¯),
subject to:
cfb + efbmfb + b = y¯ +Π,
mfb = θ1(xfb + θ0)
θ.
The solution to which gives us
y¯ +Π = cfb + efbθ1(xfb + θ0)
θ, (9)
αcκ−1fb = e
−1
fb (1− α)(xfb + θ0)
θ(κ−1), (10)
mfb = θ1(xfb + θ0)
θ. (11)
The importer’s problem, gives two more conditions for the optimal quantity of exports and the
level of profits.
Πfb = efbmfb − xfb,
mfb = θ1(xfb + θ0)
θ,
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which gives optimal levels of of xfb, Πfb:
x = (efbθ1θ)
1/(θ−1) − θ0, (12)
Π = (eθ1)
−1/(θ−1)(θ−θ/(θ−1) − θ−1/(θ−1)) + θ0. (13)
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